In this paper we propose that the conventional dichotomy between exemplar-based and prototype-based models of concept learning is helpfully viewed as an instance of what is known in the statistical learning literature as the bias/variance tradeoff. The bias/variance tradeoff can be thought of as a sliding scale that modulates how closely any learning procedure adheres to its training data. At one end of the scale (high variance), models can entertain very complex hypotheses, allowing them to fit a wide variety of data very closely-but as a result can generalize poorly, a phenomenon called overfitting. At the other end of the scale (high bias), models make relatively simple and inflexible assumptions, and as a result may fit the data poorly, called underfitting. Exemplar and prototype models of category formation are at opposite ends of this scale: prototype models are highly biased, in that they assume a simple, standard conceptual form (the prototype), while exemplar models have very little bias but high variance, allowing them to fit virtually any combination of training data. We investigated human learners' position on this spectrum by confronting them with category structures at variable levels of intrinsic complexity, ranging from simple prototype-like categories to much more complex multimodal ones. The results show that human learners adopt an intermediate point on the bias/variance continuum, inconsistent with either of the poles occupied by most conventional approaches. We present a simple model that adjusts (regularizes) the complexity of its hypotheses in order to suit the training data, which fits the experimental data better than representative exemplar and prototype models.
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Introduction
For about four decades, most research in human categorization has assumed that mental categories are ''fuzzy'' structures exhibiting varying degrees of similarity among category members (Posner, Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967; Posner & Keele, 1968; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) . More specifically, most contemporary models understand categories in terms of variations in typicality exhibited by category members (Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004; Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Nosofsky, 1986) . But researchers have been divided about how the distribution of typicality is acquired and represented, and exactly how new objects are evaluated.
The two dominant approaches, known as prototype theories and exemplar theories, make critically different assumptions about how people learn from experience with category examples. Prototype theories (e.g. Smith & Minda, 1998; Nosofsky, 1987) assume that learners induce from observed category members a central tendency, called the prototype, and use it as a composite against which to compare newly encountered items. New items judged sufficiently similar to the prototype are judged to be members of the category. Exactly how the prototype is computed, and what information it retains, differs from model to model, but all prototype models share this central process of abstraction. By contrast, in exemplar theories 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.10.004
